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STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action arising under a uniform real estate 
contract by which the defendants, Mayne, sold certain motel 
property in Roy, Utah, to the plaintiffs, Strand, and the 
plaintiffs seek to avoid forfeiture of payments made on a 
contract and improvements made on the premises. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
From a judgment dismissing the plaintiffs' complaint 
with prejudice upon motion of the defendant for summary 
judgment, the plaintiffs appeal. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiffs seek reversal of the judgment and permission 
to go to trial upon the merits. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The appellants' complaint for a first cause of action 
(R.l) alleges that April1, 1955 the plaintiffs as buyer enter-
ed into the contract marked Exhibit "A" and attached to 
the complaint with the defendants for the purchase of real 
estate consisting of land and seventeen motel units and cer-
tain personal property in Roy, Weber County, Utah. That 
the total purchase price was $41,500.00, of \Vhich the plain-
tiffs paid $7,578.58 as down payment and thereafter made 
additional payments up to and including the 3rd day of 
October, 1957 of $10,875.00. That in addition, the appellants, 
in order to place the property in habitable condition, ex-
pended for repairs, improvements, additions and equipment 
$9,567.37 which included converting a previously unusable 
portion of the front of the premises into a restaurant and 
coffee shop. That the total payments and improvements 
made by the appellants was the sum of $29,020.95; that the 
repairs and improvements made by the appellants increased 
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the market value of the property by at least $25,000.00. 
That after the execution of the agreement, the respondents 
wrongfully and continually interfered with the rental of the 
units of the motel and by reason of such interference the 
plaintiffs were unable to make payments after November 
3, 1957. That on or about January 8, 1958 the respondents 
repossessed the premises. That the reasonable rental value 
of the premises was the sum of $450.00 per month; that the 
retention by the respondents of the premises and payments 
theretofore made would be inequitable and unconscionable, 
and the appellants requested the court to determine the 
compensation to which the respondents might equitably 
be entitled and for such other relief as to the court was 
proper in the premises. 
For second cause of action the appellants alleged that 
the respondents made certain representations with respect 
to the habitable condition, the roof, the floor and sewer 
connection, upon which the appellants relied and were in-
duced to enter into the agreement, and that by reason of 
the falsity of the representations and the reliance thereon 
by the appellants, the appellants were damaged in the 
amount of $29,020.95. 
The answer of the respondents was generally a denial 
of the allegations of the complaint. Subsequently, the res-
pondents filed an amended answer and counter-claim where-
in the respondents alleged that the appellants on March 20, 
1957 sold the property to Watterson under uniform real 
estate contract marked Exhibit "1" and attached to the 
answer and counter-claim, and that by such sale the ap-
pellants lost all of their rights and claims against the re-
spondents. The respondents then allege on information and 
belief that certain individuals, Lucy Semora and Verda 
Lynn, as successors in interest to the appellants and Wat-
tersons came into possession of the premises and that the 
respondents on or about January 8, 1958, commenced an 
action in the District Court for Weber County against Lucy 
Semora and Verda Lynn seeking restitution of the pre-
mises, and that such action against Lucy Semora and Verda 
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Lynn constituted res adjudicata as against the appellants 
(R.16). Respondents further alleged that the provision of 
the contract for liquidated damaged was binding upon the 
appellants. Answering the second cause of action relative 
to fraud, the respondents alleged that the appellants had 
inspected the premises, sought independent counsel and 
advice, relied upon their own judgment, were not misin-
formed and were bound by the provision of the contract 
that the buyer accept the premises in the present condition; 
that the appellants having elected to remain in possession 
of the premises after discovering the fraud were precluded 
from rescinding, and are estopped to make any claim against 
the defendants. 
The respondents filed a motion for summary judgment 
(R.29) and a brief in support of a motion for summary 
judgment (R.30), and there having been several continu-
ances in the interim, the respondents filed a new motion 
for summary judgment on October 13, 1961 (R.53) accom-
panied by an affidavit which recited that the attached brief 
in support of summary judgment supports the motion for 
summary judgment. 
Depositions were taken, interrogatories were propound-
ed, and requests for admissions of fact were presented. 
The final brief of the respondents in support of the 
motion for summary judgment is contained in pages 76 to 
98 of the record, and the brief of the plaintiffs resisting the 
motion for summary judgment is contained in pages 99 to 
103 of the record. The facts as presented to the trial court 
in connection with the motion for summary judgment as 
contained in the brief and representations of the parties 
are graphically summarized as follows: 
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I 
(R.110) (Tr. 12-15) 
Mayne sold to Strand: 
(R.5) Uniform Real Estate Contract, April 1, 1955. 
Purchase Price ____________________ $41,500.00 
Down Payment __________________ 7,578.58 
Subsequent Payments: 
$33,921.42 
Interest __________ $ 4,156.52 
Principal ________ 7,732.57 
$11,889.09 
(Tr. 13) Balance of Principal as of 12/3/57 $26,188.85 
Improvements by Strand __ $11,726.77 
Down Payment ____________________ 7,578.58 
Subsequent Payments ________ 11,889.09 
Total Investment by 
Strand ------------------------------ $31,194.44 
(Not including current expenses) 
Period occupied: 4/1/55 to 1/6/58 = 33 months 
Reasonable Rental Value $450.00 per month= $14,850.00 
Market Value on January 6, 1958 = $63,000.00 
(Market value claimed by Respondents as of December 15, 
1961, $35,000.00, R. 97). 
II 
Strand sold by new contract to Watterson: 
(R.22) Uniform Real Estate Contract, March 20, 1957. 
Purchase Price ____________________ $63,000.00 
Recited Down Payment ____ 500.00 
Payment by assignment of 
equities in two other contracts: 
a. Nephi property netted nothing - Valueless 
b. Salt Lake property may realize ____ $2,000.00 
DEFAULTED and FORFEITED by Notice 1/29/58 
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III 
Watterson assigned the contract with Strand to Goldsby and 
Clinger July 31, 1957 
Defaulted and Forfeited by notice 1/29/58 
IV 
(See File #33330, R. 117) 
Action by Mayne for Repossession: 
a. Notice to quit served upon Lucy Semora dated 
1/8/58, and signed by John A. Hendricks, attorney for 
Mayne. 
b. Complaint by Mayne vs. Lucy Semora and Verda 
Lynn, dated January 13, 1958, for restitution of possession. 
c. Semora and Lynn answered in general denial, then 
subsequently by letter of attorney Tel Charlier, disclaimed, 
January 31, 1958. 
d. Decree February 10, 1958, awarded possession of 
premises to Mayne. 
v 
Action Commenced by Strand vs. Mayne May 13, 1958. 
The court heard the arguments of the parties on April 
23, 1962 and took the matter under advisement (R.105). A 
transcript of the proceedings is included in the record (R. 
116). The court rendered judgment dismissing the com-
plaint with prejudice on May 16, 1962, (R.109). Appellants 
filed a motion for rehearing (R.106) and requested among 
other things that the court indicate the points upon which 
the court relied in granting the motion for summary judg-
ment, which motion for rehearing was denied by the court. 
ARGUMENT 
In the conclusion to the respondents' brief (R.96) the 
respondents set forth four grounds upon which they con-
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tended the motion for summary judgment was well taken 
and the trial court not having specified the grounds upo~ 
which the judgment was granted, it is assumed that one 
or more of the four grounds stated by the respondents in 
their conclusion was the basis for the judgment and ac-
cordingly these grounds become the points of argument. 
Point 1. That the appellants' claim against the res-
pondents was not res adjudicata. 
There was never any notice of default or forfeiture 
served by the respondents upon the appellants, nor was any 
action ever taken by the respondents against the appellants 
upon the contract between the respondents and appellants. 
The respondents proceeded to recover possession from Lucy 
Semore and Verda Lynn by an action in the District Court 
for Weber County, Civil No. 33330 (R.117), but nowhere 
does it appear that Lucy Semora or Verda Lynn had any-
thing but a possessory interest in the premises. There was 
no privity of contract between the respondents and any 
other persons other than the appellants. The appellants 
never assigned the contract with the respondents to any 
other party, but contracted anew by separate real estate 
contract with the subsequent possessors, Watterson, and 
Watterson subsequently assigned to Goldsby and Clinger. 
The contract between the appellants and respondents never 
having been assigned, there is no contractual relationship 
between the respondents and any other party other than 
the appellants. The action by the respondents against Lucy 
Semora and Verda Lynn was solely for possession of the 
premises under a wrongful detention proceeding, and in 
no way purported to adjudicate the rights of the parties 
under any contract. As stated in Pearce v. Shurtz, 2 Utah 
2d 124, 270 P.2d 442, an unla\vful detainer action is an 
action to ren1ove a tenant from possession and is primarily 
against the person in possession; it is not similar to a quiet 
title action where anyone with an interest should be joined 
(Page 126) and the rights of the defendants under the con-
tract are not considered. (Page 129). The only issue raised 
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in Civil No. 33330 was that of right to possession as against 
persons having no contract interest in the property and 
did not purport to litigate the rights of parties under the 
contract. 
Point 2. The appellants by contracting under a new 
uniform real estate contract to sell the pre-
mises to Wattersons did not lose their estate, 
interest or contractual rights as against the 
respondents. 
It is to be noted that the appellants at no time assigned, 
transferred or disposed of any of its interest in the contract 
between the appellants and respondents, but entered into 
a new uniform real estate contract with Wattersons. As 
such the contractual relationship between the appellants 
and respondents remained and the appellants had separate 
contractual obligations to Wattersons. Wattersons assigned 
the Strand-Watterson contract to Goldsby and Clinger. 
Strand, by notice served January 29, 1958 upon default of 
Wattersons, Goldsby and Clinger, declared a forfeiture of 
the Watterson contract which was met by inaction of the 
part of Wattersons, Goldsby and Clinger. Watterson had 
agreed by contract to pay Strand $63,000.00 for the pre-
mises payable $500.00 down and $13,500.00 by the assign-
ment of equities in two other contracts recited to be worth 
$13,500.00, but which in fact may be worth only $2,000.00 
if and when Strand recovers on one of the contracts relat-
ing to Salt Lake City property. However assuming that 
Strand received $14,000.00 of the $63,000.00 purchase price, 
there was still due and owing to Strand the difference be-
tween the $49,000.00 balance due from Watterson to Strand 
and the $26,000.00 balance due from Strand to Mayne, a 
difference of $23,000.00 still due from Watterson to Strand 
before Watterson could succeed to Strands interest or 
equity in the property. If Strand had been paid out by Wat-
terson, instead of still being owed about $23,000.00, the 
argument of the respondent that Strand no longer had an 
interest in the contract may have some merit, but it does not 
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seem reasonable to contend that a purchaser who contracts 
to sell his interest thereby forfeits his interest in the prop-
erty, whether or not his own vendee has performed. While 
there do not seem to be many cases on this point it has 
been held that the purchaser is entitled on default of his 
grantee, to take possession of the premises and carry out 
the contract of purchase Hill v. Preston, 34 S. W. 2d 780, 
119 Tex. 522. Even in the case of an assignment it is gen-
erally held that the original vendor's acceptance of an as-
signment made by his purchaser does not place the assignee 
of the purchaser in privity of contract with the original 
vendor, 59 A. L. R. 954. Accordingly the privity between 
the original vendor and the purchaser remains in absence 
of a novation. 
Point 3. Appellants interest in the contract with the 
respondent has not been forfeited or termi-
nated. 
The respondents at no time served notice of default 
or notice of forfeiture under the contract with the appellants 
and until such notice is served the issue of damages cannot 
be resolved. The provision for forfeiture is not self execut-
ing and written notice is necessary. Howorth v. Mills, 62 
Utah 574, 221 P. 165; Leone v. Zuniga, 84 Utah 417, 34 P. 
2d 699. 
Point 4. The appellants are entitled to maintain this 
action to avoid forfeiture of the improve-
ments and payments made by the appellants. 
The appellants and purchasers were in possession of the 
property about thirty three months, from April 1, 1955 to 
January 6, 1958, during which period a purchase price of 
$41,500.00 was reduced to $26,188.85, and the appellants 
made improvements including the creation and equipment 
of a coffee shop which theretofore did not exist on the 
premises, with the cost of said improvements of about 
$11,726.77. The total investment by the appellants, as re-
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viewed supra (P 4), was $31,194.44. The difference be-
tween $31,194.44, the total investment in improvements and 
payments by appellants and the rental value for a 33 month 
period of $14,850.00 is the sum of $16,344.44, which is 39% 
of the original purchase price. The appellants contended 
that the market value of the property on or about March 
20, 1957 was between $63,000.00 and $75,000.00 (R. 77) and 
represented to the court that at the time of repossession on 
January 6, 1958, the property had a market value of $63,-
000.00 (R. 110). The respondents supplied an affidavit dated 
April 18, 1962 that the market value of the property as of 
December 15, 1961 was $35,000.00. 
The rule with respect to measure of damages is stated 
in Malmberg v. Baugh, 62 Utah 331, 218 P. 975 to be the 
difference between the contract price with interest and the 
value of the land at the time of re-entry, less any payments 
made on the contract. This doctrine was amplified in Per-
kins v. Spencer, 121 Utah 468, 243 P. 2d 446, and the 
wording of the opinion is such as to incorporate the basis 
for relief as being unjust enrichment and unconscionable 
advantage. Spencer sold a home in Provo to the plaintiff 
Perkins and brought suit in the city court in an unlawful 
detainer action alleging forfeiture of the contract. Perkins 
then commenced an action in the district court to avoid the 
strict effects of the forfeiture provision. The total purchase 
price was $10,500.00 of which Perkins had paid $2,500.00 
down and $75.00 a month, the $75.00 being a reasonable 
rental value of the premises. The trial court allowed the 
defendant to keep the payments as liquidated damages and 
awarded treble damages for unlawful detainer. This was 
reversed on appeal, first, as to the treble damages as the 
notice to quit was not properly served and strict statutory 
compliance was required. With respect to the forfeiture as 
liquidated damages of the amount paid, the court reviewed 
several cases and established certain criteria. The court 
quotes from Restatement of Contracts, Section 339, that 
the agreement for liquidated damages will be enforceable 
if (a) the amount so fixed is a reasonable forecast of just 
compensation for the harm that is caused by the breach, 
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and (b) the harm that is caused by the breach is one that 
is incapable or very difficult of accurate estimation. This 
court then commenced a review of many Utah cases where-
in they state that liquidated damages are enforceable where 
the amount stipulated is not disproportionate to the damage 
actually sustained, but that no forfeiture is allowed where 
the same is unconscionable and exhorbitant. In the case 
of Cooley v. Call, 61 Utah 203, 211 P. 977 where the for-
feiture amounted to about 10% of the purchase price, and 
in the case of Cristy v. Guild, 101 Utah 313, 121 P. 2d 401, 
where the monthly income exceeded the total payments plus 
improvements, this court held that the forfeiture did not 
amount to a penalty. However in Malmberg v. Baugh, 62 
Utah 331, 218 P. 975, where $4,450.00 of the full contract 
price of $10,000.00 was paid during the period of occupancy 
of twenty-two months, this court clearly indicated that they 
regarded forfeiture of such sum as excessive and would not 
allow its retention. The opinion of the Perkins case quotes 
from Young v. Hansen, 117 Utah 591, 218 P. 2d 666 as 
follows: 
''The contract did not provide for the retention of 
money, and even if it did, it is questionable that such 
provision could be enforced as defendants \Vould 
acquire an unconscionable advantage and, be un-
justly enriched at the expense of the plaintiffs as 
there is no showing that the defendants had suffer-
ed any damage." 
The Perkins case sets forth a formula for determining 
the damages due the seller as follows: 
''The vendors are entitled to any loss occasioned 




Loss of an advantageous bargain; 
Any damage to or depreciation of the prop-
erty; 
Any decline in value due to change in market 
value of the property not allowed for in items 
nos. 1 and 2, and 
10 
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( 4) For the fair rental value of the property dur-
ing the period of occupancy. 
The total of such sums should be deducted from the 
total amount paid in, plus any improvements for 
which it would be fair to allow recovery, and any 
remain difference a warded to the plaintiffs." 
Justice Wolf in a concurring opinion states that the 
market value determined at the time of repossession in-
cludes therein depreciation and need not be separately cal-
culated. 
In defendant's motion for summary judgment, plain-
tiffs' contentions must be considered in the light most favor-
able to the plaintiffs and all doubts should be resolved in 
favor of permitting the plaintiffs to go to trial; and only 
if when the \Vhole rna tter is so viewed, the plaintiffs never-
theless could establish no right to recovery should the 
motion be granted. 
Samms v. Eccles, 11 Utah 2d 289, 358 P2d 344; Morris 
v. Farnsworth Motel et al. 123 Utah 289, 259 P2d 297. 
In the appellants' motion for rehearing (R. 106-108) 
the appellants requested the trial court to give some in-
dication of the grounds upon which the motion for sum-
mary judgment was granted in order that the appellants 
might present opposing affidavits, amend or otherwise sup-
port its position. The court denied the motion for rehearing. 
In other cases this court has held: 
"It must appear to a certainty that the plaintiff would 
not be entitled to relief under any state of facts 
which could be proved in support of its claim before 
a judgment on the pleading may be granted." 
Securities Credit Corp. v. Willey, 1 Utah 2d 254, 265 
P2d 422. 
"The sustaining of summary motions without afford-
ing the party an opportunity to present his evidence 
is a stringent measure which courts should be re-
luctant to grant ... Accordingly, the privilege of 
11 
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presenting evidence should be denied only when, tak-
ing the view most favorable to the party' claims, he 
could not in any event establish a right to redress 
under the law; and unless it clearly so appears, 
doubts should be resolved in favor of permitting him 
to go to trial''. 
Tangren v. Ingalls, 12 Utah 2d. 388, 367 P2d 179. 
In addition to the many issues raised by the points 
above which are yet to be resolved there was the issue of 
damages for fraud. The respondents took the position that 
the only remedy which the appellants would have in the 
event of fraud was for rescission and that their failure to 
return the premises denied them the right of rescission. 
There is also the remedy of damages for fraud which is 
available to the appellants in which they may forgo the 
right to rescind and retain what they have received and 
bring an action at law to recover damages sustained. Mc-
Kellar v. Paxton, 62 Utah 97, 218 P. 128; 24 Am Jur 8, 
Fraud and Deceit, sections 190 and 191. 
Appellants respectfully request that the judgment of 
the trial court be reversed and the cause remanded for 
trial. 
Respectfully, 
GEORGE K. FADEL 
Attorney for Appellants 
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